Theory Seminar

A recent result in algorithmic mechanism design: The exponential mechanism and privacy

Travis Martin

U-M
 
Friday, November 02, 2012
10:30am - 11:30am
3941 BBB

 

About the Event

Mechanism design is a branch of game theory in which one designs a game in order to achieve a specific objective (for example, maximizing social welfare). Algorithmic mechanism design is a new field which borrows techniques from theoretical computer science to solve mechanism design questions.

In this talk we will examine a result algorithmic result from FOCS 2012, "The Exponential Mechanism for Social Welfare: Private, Truthful, and Nearly Optimal" by Huang and Kannan. The authors provide a very general method to solve any mechanism design problem with the objective of maximizing social welfare and preserving agent privacy. This is the first mechanism of this kind. Their mechanism can be seen as a generalization of the classic VCG mechanism with adjustable privacy.

The Exponential Mechanism for Social Welfare: Private, Truthful, and Nearly Optimal. FOCS 2012 http://arxiv.org/pdf/1204.1255.pdf

Additional Information

Sponsor: CSE

Open to: Public